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WITH APOLOGIES TO PAXTON BLAIR
PETER B. RUTLEDGE*
I. INTRODUCTION
I would like to thank New York University, Dean Richard
Revesz, Professors Jose´ Alvarez, Franco Ferrari, and Linda Sil-
berman, the student editors of the NYU Journal of International
Law and Politics and, most importantly, the Rubin family for
the opportunity to speak at last October’s symposium. When
one reads about the accomplishments of the Rubin family over
the last half century, both professional1 and personal, one can
only stand in awe of their record of accomplishment.
On the subject of great lawyers, it is particularly appropri-
ate to speak on forum non conveniens doctrine in New York. For
one thing, the doctrine traces its roots to a series of decisions
in New York state courts developed by members of the New
York bar.2 For another thing, the doctrine’s modern form was
heavily influenced by an article written in the early twentieth
century by Wall Street lawyer Paxton Blair and published in
the Columbia Law Review.3 Finally, New York lawyers argued
at least one side of virtually all of the major Supreme Court
cases on the doctrine in the last century.4
* Herman E. Talmadge Chair, University of Georgia School of Law.
1. Herbert Rubin of Herzfeld & Rubin, P.C. has practiced law in New
York City for more than half a century. Among his greatest accomplishments
was successfully arguing World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286 (1980) before the Supreme Court. Justice Rose L. Rubin, a retired New
York State Supreme Court Justice, served as Chief Administrative Law Judge
of the City of New York Office of Trials and Hearings during the Guiliani
Administration.
2. See GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGA-
TION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 566–69 (5th ed. 2011).
3. Paxton Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American
Law, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1929).
4. This is apparent from the attorneys of record listed in cases such as
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 237 (1981), Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gil-
bert, 330 U.S. 501, 501–02 (1947), Koster v. (Am.) Lumbermens Mut. Cas.
Co., 330 U.S. 518, 519 (1947), and Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steam-
ships Ltd., 285 U.S. 413, 414 (1932).
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1064 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 45:1063
Much has been written on the forum non conveniens doc-
trine,5 yet I nonetheless believe that recent developments in
related areas still enable scholars to offer an original perspec-
tive on the subject. In this brief essay, I advance the following
5. See, e.g., SAMUEL P. BAUMGARTNER, THE PROPOSED HAGUE CONVENTION
ON JURISDICTION AND FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: TRANS-ATLANTIC LAWMAKING FOR
TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION (2003); ANDREW S. BELL, FORUM SHOPPING AND
VENUE IN TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION (2003); RONALD A. BRAND & SCOTT R.
JABLONSKI, FORUM NON CONVENIENS: HISTORY, GLOBAL PRACTICE, AND FUTURE
UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS (2007);
J.J. FAWCETT, DECLINING JURISDICTION IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (P.B.
Carter ed., 1995); INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE REGULATION OF
FORUM SELECTION (Fourteenth Sokol Colloquium, Jack L. Goldsmith ed.,
1997); MICHAEL MOUSA KARAYANNI, FORUM NON CONVENIENS IN THE MODERN
AGE (2004); Edward L. Barrett, Jr., The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens,
35 CAL. L. REV. 380 (1947); Alexander M. Bickel, The Doctrine of Forum Non
Conveniens as Applied in the Federal Courts in Matters of Admiralty, 35 CORNELL
L.Q. 12 (1949); Blair, supra note 3; Robert Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal R
Forum, 60 HARV. L. REV. 908 (1947); Ronald A. Brand, Comparative Forum
Non Conveniens and the Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments, 37
TEX. INT’L L.J. 467 (2002); Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Conflict and
Jurisdictional Equilibration: Paths to a Via Media?, 26 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 385
(2004); Martin Davies, Time to Change the Federal Forum Non Conveniens Analy-
sis, 77 TUL. L. REV. 309 (2002); Douglas W. Dunham & Eric F. Gladbach,
Forum Non Conveniens and Foreign Plaintiffs in the 1990s, 24 BROOK. J. INT’L L.
665 (1999); Walter W. Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and Retaliatory Legisla-
tion: The Impact on the Available Alternative Forum Inquiry and on the Desirability
of Forum Non Conveniens as a Defense Tactic, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 609 (2008);
Julius Jurianto, Forum Non Conveniens: Another Look at Conditional Dismis-
sals, 83 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 369 (2006); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Editorial
Comment, Forum Shopping, Antisuit Injunctions, Negative Declarations, and Re-
lated Tools of International Litigation, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 314 (1997); Elizabeth
T. Lear, National Interests, Foreign Injuries, and Federal Forum Non Conveniens,
41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 559 (2007); Elizabeth T. Lear, Congress, The Federal
Courts, and Forum Non Conveniens: Friction on the Frontier of the Inherent Power,
91 IOWA L. REV. 1147 (2006); Alexander Reus, Judicial Discretion: A Compara-
tive View of the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Germany, 16 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 455 (1994); William
L. Reynolds, The Proper Forum for a Suit: Transnational Forum Non Conveniens
and Counter-Suit Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1663 (1992);
Joel H. Samuels, When Is an Alternative Forum Available? Rethinking the Forum
Non Conveniens Analysis, 85 IND. L.J. 1059 (2010); Linda J. Silberman, Develop-
ments in Jurisdiction and Forum Non Conveniens in International Litigation:
Thoughts on Reform and a Proposal for a Uniform Standard, 28 TEX. INT’L L.J.
501 (1993); Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-
Access Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 781 (1985); Martine Stu¨ckelberg, Lis
Pendens and Forum Non Conveniens at the Hague Conference, 26 BROOK. J.
INT’L L. 949 (2001).
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2013] WITH APOLOGIES TO PAXTON BLAIR 1065
thesis: the forum non conveniens doctrine developed in response
to a specific set of doctrines and specific social phenomena.
The waning of some of those doctrines have diminished
though not altogether eliminated the need for forum non con-
veniens, which always has had a suspect status following Erie’s
declaration that there is “no federal general common law.”6
While it is most certainly not the case that the underlying justi-
fication for the forum non conveniens doctrine has disappeared
entirely, other doctrines may potentially better serve those
residual functions. At bottom, then, we are entering an era
where the forum non conveniens doctrine is ripe for radical reex-
amination.
II. FORUM NON CONVENIENS AND JURISDICTION
To begin to develop this thesis, let me align myself with
the views of Linda Silberman and Steve Burbank that the forum
non conveniens doctrine cannot be understood except by refer-
ence to a polity’s views on jurisdiction—judicial, prescriptive,
and enforcement.7 Seen in this light, at the early stages of the
Republic, the need for a doctrine like forum non conveniens was
rather thin. Courts took a narrow view of their judicial jurisdic-
tion over non-residents and a similarly crabbed view of their
legislatures’ ability to regulate extraterritorial conduct.8 The
combined effect of these views was to reduce inter-jurisdic-
tional competition because it was highly unlikely that more
than one state (or nation) might lay claim to regulating (or
resolving) a dispute.
Admiralty cases supplied the prime exception to the gen-
eral lack of inter-jurisdictional competition. Foreign flagged
vessels temporarily entering the United States might engage in
conduct triggering some legal claim during their stay. Exam-
ples include claims by foreign seamen against foreign flagged
vessels or, in the famous case of Canada Malting Co. Ltd. v. Pat-
erson Steamships Ltd., cases between two foreign flagged vessels
6. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
7. Burbank, supra note 5; Silberman, supra note 5. R
8. See, e.g., Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909)
(rejecting the extraterritorial application of U.S. law); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95
U.S. 714 (1877) (holding that a state only has jurisdiction over a non-resi-
dent if that person is served with process in the state or voluntarily appears).
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1066 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 45:1063
that collided while technically in United States waters.9 Under
these circumstances, the need for a doctrine like forum non con-
veniens became readily apparent: more than one nation might
reasonably lay claim to regulating the conduct at issue or
resolving the dispute. Yet given the distinct “foreignness” of
these admiralty cases, the doctrine (which often was not even
formally denominated forum non conveniens) served a function
more akin to the modern-day international comity doctrine.10
A United States court would abstain from resolving the suit in
order to avoid aggravating a foreign sovereign that might rea-
sonably lay a superior claim to resolving the parties’ liabilities.
Apart from these sorts of cases, so long as jurisdictional rules
remained restrictive (and consequently the risks of jurisdic-
tional competition limited) the need for a channeling doc-
trine like forum non conveniens remained correspondingly lim-
ited.
As jurisdictional rules loosened in the early decades of the
twentieth century, the potential for jurisdictional competition
grew. By this point, the Pennoyer v. Neff11 doctrine had largely
broken down.  No longer was it strictly necessary that a non-
resident defendant be personally served in the forum state or
voluntarily appear there in order for in personam jurisdiction to
lie.  Instead its originally strict limits had become riddled with
exceptions like consent, presence, and doing business.12 As
other scholars have thoroughly accounted,13 the steady ero-
sion of Pennoyer culminated in International Shoe v. Washington,
which jettisoned this framework in favor of one based on “min-
imum contacts.”14
9. Canada Malting Co., 285 U.S. at 413.
10. For classic doctrinal definitions of comity, see Socie´te´ Nationale In-
dustrielle Ae´rospatiale v. U.S. District Court, 482 U.S. 522 n.27 (1987)
(“Comity refers to the spirit of cooperation in which a domestic tribunal
approaches the resolution of cases touching the laws and interests of other
sovereign states.”); Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 135 (1895) (“[T]he in-
quiry, therefore, what comity is, is only another mode of inquiring what the
law is in respect to the force which the laws, judicial proceedings or other
acts done in one State ought to have in another State.”). For a good schol-
arly exposition on the concept, see William S. Dodge, International Comity in
American Courts, available at http://www.asil.org/files/dodge.pdf.
11. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 714.
12. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 2, at 86–91. R
13. Id. at 933, n.1.
14. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
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Similar developments occurred in other fields. With re-
spect to prescriptive jurisdiction, the territoriality principle ex-
emplified by decisions like American Banana15 was overtaken by
tests grounded on the “effects” of a party’s conduct on the reg-
ulating jurisdiction.16 In admiralty jurisdiction, the Court em-
ployed a multi-factor approach to the regulation of foreign-
flagged vessels.17 By relaxing the limits on prescriptive and ju-
dicial jurisdiction, these developments significantly enhanced
the risks of interstate jurisdictional competition.
Amid these developments, it is hardly surprising that Pax-
ton Blair issued his famous call for the increased judicial use of
the previously obscure doctrine of forum non conveniens.  Blair
lamented the explosion of court dockets, the consequent bur-
den on the courts, and the ultimate delay borne by the par-
ties.18
Shortly thereafter, the forum non conveniens doctrine ex-
panded its reach. The two Supreme Court decisions formally
enshrining the doctrine in federal common law—Gulf Oil v.
Gilbert19 and Koster v. Lumbermans Mutual Casualty Co.20—both
were decided a mere two years after the Supreme Court’s semi-
nal decision in International Shoe. While these decisions cer-
tainly found support in the above-described admiralty deci-
sions such as Canada Malting, they served a fundamentally dif-
ferent purpose. Instead of international comity, considerations
of jurisdictional competition and forum shopping animated
the Court’s treatment of the doctrine. Thus, the familiar fac-
tors guiding the forum non conveniens doctrine took greater ac-
count of the “private” interests of the litigants and not just the
public interests of the regulating sovereign.
While the federal transfer statute eventually codified the
doctrine for cases involving competition and forum shopping
15. Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443
(2d Cir. 1945) (holding that U.S. antitrust law applies to actions committed
outside the territory of the United States that are intended to and actually
have an effect in the United States).
17. See, e.g., Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 583–91 (1953) (employing
a seven-factor test).
18. See Blair, supra note 3, at 1, 25. R
19. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
20. Koster v. (Am.) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947).
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within the federal system,21 cases involving competition and
forum shopping across international boundaries remained un-
regulated by statute and instead subject to federal common
law. The incidence of those transnational cases only grew
more pronounced by the 1960’s as the stream of commerce
doctrine began to summon international manufacturers to dis-
tant U.S. forums based on the sale and resale of their products
in the United States.22
The Court might have stemmed this rising tide of interna-
tional jurisdictional competition by trimming back its liberal-
ized judicial and prescriptive jurisdictional doctrines. Yet, in
1980, when Herbert Rubin prevailed in World Wide Volkswagen
v. Woodson,23 the issue of jurisdiction over the foreign manu-
facturers was not before the Court.  Instead, the Court merely
had to consider the effects of liberal conceptions of personal
jurisdiction on interstate commerce, not international com-
merce. When Piper Aircraft v. Reyno24 reached the Court a year
later, forum non conveniens became the vehicle by which it
could trim back excessive assertions of jurisdiction by United
States courts in cases against foreign companies.
To do so, the Reyno Court transformed the doctrine in sev-
eral critical respects. First, it required federal courts to con-
sider the “adequacy” of the foreign forum (something not re-
quired by the earlier comity-based doctrine applied in Canada
Malting)25 and to set a low bar for adequacy.26 Second, it ar-
ticulated a principle of differentiated deference to the plain-
21. 62 Stat. 937, June 25, 1948 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1404
(2011)).
22. See, e.g., Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d
432 (1961) (foreign radiator valve manufacturer did not directly conduct
business in Illinois, but was subject to suit there when one of its valves mal-
functioned and injured plaintiff); Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke,
509 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1975) (following Gray in federal court).
23. World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (ad-
dressing the question of whether New York corporations could be sued in
Oklahoma).
24. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981) (declining to hear a
claim related to a plane crash in Scotland on the basis of forum non con-
veniens).
25. See discussion in supra text accompanying notes 9–10. R
26. Specifically, the Court held that differences in substantive law and
even potential recovery did not render a forum inadequate. Reyno, 454 U.S.
at 247–56.
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tiffs’ choice of forum based on the plaintiffs’ nationality, one
of the few instances in Supreme Court jurisprudence where
the Court affirmatively sanctioned a degree of discrimination
based on nationality.27 Third, drawing on the “private interest”
factors that now animated the doctrine after Gulf Oil and Kos-
ter, the Court recognized the possibility of conditioning dismis-
sal on the defendant’s consent to various matters, including
waiving certain defenses or honoring any judgment rendered
by the foreign court. Thus, the modern form of the forum non
conveniens doctrine embraced in Reyno can be understood to
respond to a very particular set of conditions, namely the ex-
tensive jurisdictional competition enabled by the apex of liber-
alized doctrines of judicial and prescriptive jurisdiction.28
After Reyno jurisdictional and venue doctrines did not
counterbalance each other as they did in the 1940’s, but in-
stead joined forces to increase restrictions on access to federal
courts. In the years immediately following Reyno, United States
law, both statutory and judge-made, underwent a series of
changes that further reduced the risks of jurisdictional compe-
tition. The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act
trimmed the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction in the anti-
trust context.29 Such statutory developments were paralleled
on the judicial side by the articulation of comity-based limits
on prescriptive jurisdiction (such as the Timberlane factors30)
and, more generally, the reemergence of the territoriality ca-
27. For criticism, see Burbank, supra note 5, at 393–94. R
28. Here, I focus on the effect of these doctrinal developments in juris-
dictional competition. As I have explained elsewhere, these developments
also exacerbated comity concerns. The “adequacy” determination forced
federal courts to make value-laden judgments about foreign forums, and the
possibility of “conditional dismissals” invited courts to impose unwelcome
procedural proscriptions on those foreign courts. See Peter B. Rutledge, To-
ward a Functional Approach to Sovereign Equality, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 181 (2012).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2011).
30. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d
597, 614 (9th Cir. 1976) (“The elements to be weighed include the degree of
conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or allegiance of the parties
and the locations or principal places of business of corporations, the extent
to which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve compli-
ance, the relative significance of effects on the United States as compared
with those elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm
or affect American commerce, the foreseeability of such effect, and the rela-
tive importance to the violations charged of conduct within the United
States as compared with conduct abroad.”).
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non in cases like Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v.
Aramco.31 Developments in the judicial jurisdiction sphere
complemented this trimming, especially the Court’s reluc-
tance to embrace any sweeping “stream of commerce” theory
in its jurisprudence and its refusal to accept Justice Brennan’s
invitation to reconceptualize the whole canon of constitutional
civil jurisdiction as a multi-faceted “fairness and reasonable-
ness” test.32
More recent trends in the last decade have only acceler-
ated the decline in jurisdictional competition, thereby further
eroding the need for the forum non conveniens doctrine. The
most significant trend has been the continued retraction of
jurisdictional doctrines. On the prescriptive jurisdiction side,
the Supreme Court’s broad pronouncement in Morrison v. Na-
tional Australia Bank that the presumption against the extrater-
ritorial application of federal statutes applies “in all cases” has
significantly reduced the risk of inter-jurisdictional regulatory
competition over conduct taking place outside the territory of
the United States.33 On the judicial side, the Supreme Court’s
decision in Goodyear v. Brown largely shuts down general juris-
diction as a vehicle for exercising authority over cases involv-
ing foreign conduct and foreign defendants.34 In a similar
vein, the plurality opinion in J McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro
signals a broader intent on the part of at least four justices to
return the constitutional rules governing judicial jurisdiction
to their territorial roots (seemingly subject to a latitude given
to Congress to authorize jurisdiction on the basis of nation-
31. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S.
244, 248 (1991).
32. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 116
(1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment);
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299 (1980) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
33. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2881 (2010). For
a discussion of post-Morrison decisions, see Rutledge, supra note 28, at 195 R
n.64.
34. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846
(2011) (holding that occasional sales of tires in North Carolina through
other Goodyear entities did not create sufficient links to the state to justify
the exercise of general jurisdiction).
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wide contacts).35 The collective effect of these developments is
to reduce the incidence of jurisdictional competition and,
consequently, to reduce the need for the forum non conveniens
doctrine to operate as a mechanism for channeling disputes
among different national forums.
While the trend in United States jurisprudence has been
to reduce the need for forum non conveniens, the trend interna-
tionally has been to jettison the doctrine altogether. Europe
did so long ago, preferring instead to opt for a “first filed” rule
and a robust “lis pendens” doctrine (at least as pertains to fo-
rum shopping within European courts).36 Similarly, the Hague
Choice of Courts Convention (signed though not ratified by
the United States) would abandon the doctrine entirely in dis-
putes subject to forum selection clauses within the scope of the
Convention.37 As with the domestic developments in jurisdic-
tional law, these international developments also have miti-
gated the need for a robust forum non conveniens doctrine in
the twenty-first century.
III. THE COUNTER-NARRATIVE
As with any conceptual account, there is a counter-narra-
tive, and fairness to the doctrine requires me to address two
bits of evidence suggesting that forum non conveniens should
not be so lightly abandoned. The first is the Supreme Court’s
decision in Sinochem International v. Malaysian International
Shipping Corporation,38 where a unanimous Court held that a
district court could dismiss a case on forum non conveniens
grounds without the need to address threshold jurisdictional
issues like subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction.
The effect of this decision was to accentuate the importance of
forum non conveniens dismissals. Had the Court reached the op-
posite conclusion and required district courts to address juris-
35. J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2789 (2011)
(finding that jurisdiction would be improper where the foreign entity did
not intentionally avail itself of the laws of New Jersey).
36. See Council Regulation 44/2001, art. 27, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1 (EC)
[hereinafter European Regulation 44/2001].
37. Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements arts. 4–5, June
30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294, available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/conven-
tions/txt37en.pdf.
38. Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422
(2007).
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dictional defenses before turning to venue defenses such as
forum non conveniens, the use of the doctrine might well have
been reduced.
While Sinochem enhanced the likelihood that courts would
resolve cases on forum non conveniens grounds it should not be
understood as an reaffirmation of the doctrine’s essential im-
portance as a device for channeling disputes among multiple
forums laying claim to them. Instead, as I have explained else-
where, the decision is best understood as an effort to conserve
judicial resources.39 Forcing district courts to follow a strict se-
quence for resolving cases (as early cases like Steel Company40
were read to suggest) would require district courts to invest
more resources to resolve nettlesome questions and risk an er-
roneous result. By contrast, the Sinochem approach, which ac-
cords district courts a degree of flexibility to choose from
among potential non-merits grounds for dismissal, conserves
judicial resources by allowing district courts to avoid complex
issues and instead resolve a case on a more straightforward
one. At bottom then, Sinochem should not be read to herald a
reaffirmation of the importance of forum non conveniens.
The second and more problematic bit of evidence sup-
porting the counter-narrative is the Supreme Court’s decision
in Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Company.41 Quackenbush is a
sleeper of a case for most lawyers but a dream for federal juris-
diction nerds. The Court held that a federal court may not
abstain from exercising jurisdiction over a case where the only
remedy sought by the plaintiff is damages (as opposed to equi-
table relief).42 Taken literally, Quackenbush might well have
been the death knell for the forum non conveniens doctrine be-
cause it prohibits almost precisely what a federal court does
when it declines to exercise jurisdiction over a case in favor of
a foreign forum.43 Yet when it confronted the logical implica-
tions of its rule for the forum non conveniens doctrine the Court
39. See Peter B. Rutledge, Decisional Sequencing, 62 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2010).
40. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998)
(rejecting the “hypothetical jurisdiction” doctrine that allowed consideration
of merits issues before determining jurisdiction).
41. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706 (1996).
42. Id. at 716–23, 731.
43. Technically, an issue arises whether a district court resolving a case
on forum non conveniens grounds should dismiss the case or merely suspend
proceedings. The latter keeps the case on the court’s docket. For a discus-
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blinked. The end of Justice O’Connor’s opinion (the part
where the Court always confronts the greatest challenge to its
rulings) distinguishes forum non conveniens from other absten-
tion-related doctrines:
The fact that we have applied the forum non conveniens
doctrine in this manner does not change our analysis
in this case, where we deal with the scope of the Bur-
ford abstention doctrine. To be sure, the abstention
doctrines and the doctrine of forum non conveniens
proceed from a similar premise: In rare circum-
stances, federal courts can relinquish their jurisdic-
tion in favor of another forum. But our abstention
doctrine is of a distinct historical pedigree, and the
traditional considerations behind dismissal for forum
non conveniens differ markedly from those informing
the decision to abstain. Federal courts abstain out of
deference to the paramount interests of another sov-
ereign, and the concern is with principles of comity
and federalism. Dismissal for forum non conveniens, by
contrast, has historically reflected a far broader range
of considerations, most notably the convenience to
the parties and the practical difficulties that can at-
tend the adjudication of a dispute in a certain local-
ity.44
This treatment of forum non conveniens in Quackenbush cannot
be as easily rationalized as its treatment of the doctrine in Si-
nochem. The Court’s opinion carefully avoids denying that the
forum non conveniens doctrine involves the same considerations
of comity and deference to other sovereigns that the Court
uses to distinguish abstention doctrines. It hardly could have
done so. As I explained above, it was precisely in such consid-
erations that the doctrine found its origin in the United
States.45 Instead, the Court rather blithely notes that the doc-
trine has “reflected a far broader range of considerations”46
without explaining precisely why those considerations counte-
nance a different result. This weak reasoning suggests that the
sion of this oft-overlooked remedial question, see BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra
note 2. R
44. Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 722–23 (citations omitted).
45. See supra text accompanying note 9. R
46. Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 723.
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Court’s salvaging of forum non conveniens from the jaws of its
more general ruling limiting the application of abstention
doctrine can only be understood as an affirmation of the doc-
trine’s importance as a channeling device in transnational
cases. In this regard, Quackenbush admittedly presents a chal-
lenge to my thesis that the doctrine is diminishing in impor-
tance. But this is so only because the Court failed to have the
courage of its convictions and simply see their principle
through to its logical conclusion.
IV. WHITHER FORUM NON CONVENIENS?
Given the waning relevance of forum non conveniens one is
left to wonder precisely what role the doctrine plays today. It
would appear to be of limited use to foreign defendants who
already have firmer protections as a result of Goodyear and Ni-
castro. It likewise has little role in cases involving foreign con-
duct and federal statutes now that Morrison limits the reach of
federal law. Consequently, in the twenty-first century the doc-
trine would appear to have the greatest bite in cases involving
tort and other common law claims based on conduct taking
place abroad but brought in the United States by foreign
plaintiffs against domestic defendants because of some per-
ceived procedural advantage (such as class action, discovery,
or attorneys’ fees).47
Seen in this light, the continued vitality of the doctrine of
forum non conveniens raises two fundamental questions. First,
should there be a doctrine essentially designed to allow domes-
tic defendants to avoid jurisdiction in their own home forums?
Second, even assuming that such a doctrine should exist as a
matter of policy, what institution should engage in that policy
assessment?
One could well imagine that the answer to the first ques-
tion would be “no.” Home forums might well have a strong
regulatory interest in having disputes involving their local
companies heard at home. Moreover, plaintiffs might well file
in the defendant’s home forum not in order to secure some
tactical advantage, but simply to enhance the enforceability of
an eventual judgment (particularly where the domestic defen-
47. I thank Linda Silberman, Steve Burbank, and Judge Diane Wood for
their observations on this point during conversation following my remarks at
the symposium.
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dant lacks assets in the forum where the underlying events
took place). Of course, good countervailing arguments exist
on the other side of this question. Certainly there have been
instances where a foreign plaintiffs’ choice of forum can be
explained by nothing other than naked forum shopping. Reyno
might well be a good example.48 Moreover, doctrines like con-
ditional dismissals can address the concern about judgment
enforceability by requiring that the domestic defendant agree
to be bound by and to execute on the eventual judgment fol-
lowing the forum non conveniens dismissal.
As to the second question, one could well imagine that
the answer would be “Congress should engage in the policy as-
sessment.” Obviously, Congress has authorized federal court
jurisdiction over certain cases, and the forum non conveniens
doctrine interferes with a court’s “unflagging obligation”49 to
exercise its jurisdiction over those cases. Moreover, because
Congress has seen fit in other contexts to instruct courts when
they should stay their hand, it stands to reason that when they
don’t do so courts should be reluctant to step in and arrogate
the power to decline jurisdiction unto themselves.50
Here too, of course, there is a counterargument. One
might contend that the forum non conveniens doctrine serves as
a sort of gap filler for cases that Congress could not have antic-
ipated when it authorized subject matter jurisdiction. Alterna-
tively, one could point to the decades of congressional silence
since the Supreme Court first formalized the forum non con-
veniens doctrine.51 While that argument is not without its de-
tractors,52 it finds some support in legislation which demon-
48. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 237 (1981).
49. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,
817 (1976).
50. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 7421 (2011) (prohibiting suits “for the purpose
of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax”); 28 U.S.C. § 1341
(limiting the ability of federal district courts to enjoin state law tax collection
proceedings); Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256,
106 Stat. 73 (codified in statutory note following 28 U.S.C. § 1350) (requir-
ing exhaustion of remedies in the jurisdiction where conduct giving rise to
the claim occurred).
51. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530
(1967) (finding tacit consent in Congressional silence with respect to the
federal interpleader statute).
52. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 671 (1987) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (“The majority’s response . . . asserts that, since ‘Congress has
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strates that Congress knows perfectly well how to forbid the
courts from applying judicially crafted abstention-based doc-
trines it disagrees with.53 Congress’s failure to do so in the fo-
rum non conveniens context could thus be understood as a sort
of tacit approval.
At this point in the argument, it is perhaps appropriate to
clearly state what I am saying—and what I am not. In no way
do I fault American companies for seeking forum non con-
veniens dismissals. Forum shopping unquestionably occurs,
and the forum non conveniens doctrine supplies an efficacious
tool for combatting it. At the same time, I am saying that,
given the evolutions in jurisdictional doctrines, forum non con-
veniens might not be the best calibrated tool for addressing the
residual set of cases in which it appears to remain most impor-
tant. So what would an alternative look like?
Four alternatives present themselves. One alternative
would be for the Supreme Court to abolish the forum non con-
veniens doctrine altogether. This would have the palliative ef-
fect of a forcing rule54 prompting Congress to either embrace
a statute not unlike Section 140455 (except regulating the sus-
pension or dismissal of cases in favor of a foreign court instead
of a transfer within the federal system) or accept the doctrine’s
demise. The downside of this approach is that it presupposes a
congressional willingness to act. Absent congressional action
this approach would leave domestic defendants vulnerable to
excessive forum shopping by plaintiffs.
A second option would be to scale back the doctrine to
one more concerned with comity and restore the doctrine to
its Canada Malting roots. This would have several salutary ef-
fects. It would get courts out of the business of making value-
laden judgments about whether a foreign forum is “adequate.”
It likewise would get courts out of the business of discriminat-
not amended the statute to reject our construction, . . . we . . . may assume
that our interpretation was correct.’ This assumption, which frequently
haunts our opinions, should be put to rest.”).
53. See, e.g., Second Hickenlooper Amendment, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2)
(2011) (restricting the application of the act of state doctrine); Helms-Bur-
ton Act, 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(6) (2011) (same).
54. For a discussion of these rules, see generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gert-
ner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99
YALE L.J. 87, 95–100 (1989).
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2011).
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ing among domestic and foreign plaintiffs, something not au-
thorized by the statutes granting subject matter jurisdiction.56
Finally, it would reduce the need for paternalistic “conditional
dismissals.” Instead, a comity-based approach would enable a
court to undertake a nuanced case-by-case analysis of the partic-
ular implications of the exercise of jurisdiction for the foreign
relations of the United States.
Third, the Supreme Court might move in the direction of
the European model and replace forum non conveniens with a lis
alibi pendens approach. Under a lis alibi pendens approach,
courts presumptively defer to the first court in which a suit is
filed, at least until that court has ascertained whether it has
competence over the dispute. This has been the approach
adopted in European Regulation 44/2001 with respect to par-
allel proceedings filed within the European Union.57 The up-
sides of this approach include a relative clarity as well as avoid-
ance of the sorts of value-laden judgments that sometimes be-
devil the forum non conveniens doctrine (both as a positive and
normative matter). The downside, as the European experi-
ence with the lis pendens doctrine has demonstrated, is that it
can actually worsen forum shopping.58 Defendants have little
recourse in cases where plaintiffs exploit broad theories of ju-
risdiction, and on the other side of the coin, plaintiffs may
have little recourse if defendants file a preemptive suit to tie
them up in protracted litigation in unfriendly forums (like It-
aly) known to move exceptionally slowly.59
Fourth, the Supreme Court might move in the direction
of a much more modest version of the forum non conveniens
doctrine along the lines of proposed Articles 21 and 22 of the
draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments.60 Al-
though generally adopting an approach similar to lis pendens,
56. See text accompanying infra note 63. R
57. See European Regulation 44/2001, supra note 36. R
58. See Peter B. Rutledge, Convergence and Divergence in International Dis-
pute Resolution, 2012 J. DISP. RES. 49, 55.
59. Case C-185/07, Allianz SpA v. West Tankers Inc., 2009 E.C.R. I-663,
[2009] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 413, 416–17 (holding that the use of an anti-suit in-
junction to prevent parties from using such a tactic is incompatible with Eu-
ropean Regulation 44/2001).
60. See Hague Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforce-
ment of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, arts. 21–22, Oct. 30,
1999, available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgmpd11.pdf.
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articles 21 and 22 envisioned a limited opportunity for forum
non conveniens dismissal where warranted by the private inter-
ests of the case.61 In contrast to the rigid “first filed” rule such
as that which predominates in Europe, this would mitigate the
worst risks of forum shopping while avoiding miring courts in
value-laden judgments about the “public interest” in where a
suit should be heard.62
Whichever of these innovations a Supreme Court were to
adopt, they would herald several improvements over the cur-
rent version of the forum non conveniens doctrine. For one
thing, any of these versions would avoid the difficulties that
have arisen over the proper level of deference to the plaintiffs’
choice of forum. Reyno suggested a rather blunt approach that
essentially favored enhanced deference to domestic plaintiffs
and weaker deference to foreign ones. Not only does this ap-
proach seemingly embed a principle of discrimination in the
doctrine as Steve Burbank has observed, it has proven remark-
ably difficult to apply in cases where the plaintiffs comprise an
amalgam of domestic and foreign parties.63 Notwithstanding
the Second Circuit’s commendable efforts in the Irragori deci-
sion to put some flesh on the bones of Reyno’s general princi-
ple of deference to the plaintiffs’ choice of forum,64 the doc-
trine remains hopelessly opaque. Reforms along the lines de-
scribed above avoid these difficulties.
Any of the four potential paths for reform I have identi-
fied also would obviate the need to undertake the adequacy
analysis. As I have explained elsewhere, the adequacy analysis
actually undercuts one of the central purposes of the doc-
trine.65 While the forum non conveniens doctrine aims to mini-
mize jurisdictional competition (presumably on the theory
that this somehow exacerbates international tensions), the ad-
61. See id.
62. For a good description of the draft Convention’s history, see BRAND
& JABLONSKI, supra note 5. R
63. See Burbank, supra note 5, at 393–94. For a difficult case on how to R
apply the deference principle, see Tazoe v. Airbus S.A.S., 631 F.3d 1321
(11th Cir. 2011) (plaintiffs in consolidated action were largely though not
exclusively foreign).
64. See Irragori v. United Techs. Corp., 274 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2001) (en
banc) (setting out a “sliding scale” of deference to plaintiff’s choice of fo-
rum).
65. Rutledge, supra note 28, at 187–88. R
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equacy analysis simply worsens matters by miring courts in
value-laden judgments about the acceptability or unac-
ceptability of a foreign forum. To make matters worse, unlike
the retrospective “fairness” analysis that courts sometimes must
undertake when deciding whether to enforce a foreign judg-
ment, the “adequacy” analysis prong of forum non conveniens
requires courts to undertake a prospective prediction about
how they think a foreign forum will assess the lawsuit.
Finally, any of these variations would also avoid adventur-
ous misapplications of the doctrine. Among the most egre-
gious has been the occasional trend, unfortunately in the Sec-
ond Circuit, to allow for forum non conveniens dismissals in the
enforcement of certain treaty rights such as those under the
New York Convention.66 The entire purpose underlying the
New York Convention is to enhance the currency of arbitral
awards and to make open the courts of signatory countries
(for instance where the award debtor has assets in those coun-
tries). Thus, as Judge Lynch recently observed in his trenchant
dissent in the Figueiredo case in the Second Circuit, to apply the
forum non conveniens doctrine in actions to enforce rights
granted under those treaties seemingly violates the interna-
tional law obligations of the signatory state.67 Reformulating
the forum non conveniens doctrine as a comity principle or elim-
inating it altogether subject to congressional override would
eliminate the possibility that courts will construe the doctrine
to apply in these sorts of settings, where the international law
obligations of the United States coupled with the general
grant of jurisdiction by Congress create a double presumption
in favor of hearing the case.
The theme of this symposium—“Tug of War: The Ten-
sion Between Regulation and International Cooperation”—
has many facets. As Jose´ Alvarez explained in his opening re-
marks, one facet is the degree to which countries, including
the United States, will tolerate jurisdictional competition or in-
stead employ doctrines designed to mitigate it. In my view,
shifts in the jurisdictional paradigm, particularly over the last
two decades (including ones to which Herbert Rubin contrib-
66. See Figueiredo Ferraz E Engenharia de Projeto Ltda. v. Republic of
Peru, 665 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2011); Monegasque De Reassurances S.A.M. v.
Nak Naftogaz of Ukraine, 311 F.3d 488, 497–98 (2d Cir. 2002).
67. See Figueiredo, 665 F.3d at 394 (Lynch, J., dissenting).
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uted on behalf of his clients), have diminished the importance
of forum non conveniens as a device to mitigate such competi-
tion. To be sure, the need for such a doctrine has not been
eliminated entirely, but other more modest measures might
fill the gap. Thus, with respect to this particular “tug of war” I
stand on the other side of the rope from Paxton Blair. At pre-
sent I may not be pulling strongly, but if present trends con-
tinue, I expect to see a continued move away from Blair’s doc-
trine as a solution to the diminishing problem of inter-jurisdic-
tional competition.
